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There was nothing 'very glorious about the return of Hong Kong 
to British rule It resembled an improvised scramble with alhes and 
enemies quickly reversmg roles anudst a situat10n that paralleled the 
chaos of December 1941.τ＇he difficulties of出eBritish position were 
illustrated by two rad10 messag田 sentout at the end of August 1945 
from their senior officials responsible for Hong Kong. The first was 
broadcast on 28 August to Chungkmg(for retransmiss10n abroad) from 
Frank Gimson the prewar colorual secretary, who, largely on his 
own imtiative, had reasserted British rule when news of Japan’s 
decision to surrender percolated through to the camps, the second, a 
day later, was a series of mstructions to the Japanese commander in 
the territory from the Bril!sh task force newly stationed off Hong 
Kong Bo白 statementscontamed a mはtureof outward strength and 
an accurate appreciation of the difficulties facing British civil and 
military units Gimson’s was smtably patriotic, but acknowledged 
that his opportunity to speak was obtained 'with the concu町enceof 
the Japanese.’The weakness of his authority in the face of local and 
external uncertainties was further underlined when Gimson spoke of 
having reestablished an office in V 1ctona once agam、iVithJapanese 
acq山田cenceand ended with an urgent plea for the ret町nof British 
troops‘which I trust will not be much longer deferred. 伸 Rear
Admiral Harcourt was equally cautious He could only enter Hong 
Kong harbour with the assistance of Japanese pilots and their charts 
and, more 1mpnrtantly，‘to ensure出atlaw and order is maintained 
and that there can be no opportu凶tyfor bad elements to loot or 
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riot' he needed Japanese cooperat10n and expected ‘the stnct 
discipline of Japanese and Japanese controlled Forces to be 
maintained.’The reoccupation of Hong Kong was to be an 
Anglo-Japanese afair. Harcourt would need to balance the fact of 
victory over Japan wi出 therealization出atJapanese local forc田
had to be pressganged into keeping the peace, since neither Chiang 
Kai-shek'" nor Chinese residents in Hong Kong'司 wereabout to 
applaud the liberators. The same strategy of coopting Japane!;e 
Jmpenal forces to support the returnmg metropolitan powers was 
simultaneously put into effect throughout South East Asia Com-
mand Imperialism (however discredited) was stil in出esaddle. 
Preliminary meetmgs between the Bntish and Japanese com-
manders were far from smoo出 MaiorGeneral Fukuclu complamed 
on 31 August of mc1dents were Japanese troops had been chsanned 
by British soldiers during a near riot, while Harcourt and Gimson, in 
charge of civil government before being shipped home and later 
rewarded with the governorship of Singapore, were both abrupt. The 
minutes of their meeting, however, had a slightly comic side. 
Harcourt, for example, reminded Fukuchi that, whlle Japanese urn ts 
would be responsible for law and order on land, the British would 
control the harbour. This produced the following exchange: 
‘Harcourt “It will be nece田町yto dem1htarise the Japanese 
torpedo boats. There is to be no movement of 
merchant shipping without my pe口ni田ion
Arrangements are to be made to deal with al 
landing craft and suicide boats. 
Fukuch1 English or Japanese suicide boats? 
Harcourt: Japanese, of co町田〈蜘
More serious disputes arose over what the British saw as tardiness 
by the Japanese and deliberate attemp回 todrag their feet There 
was also bitterness over也ecomposit10n of the Japanese negotiatmg 
committee and its efforts to田curethe personal safety of Japanese 
residents and the protect10n of their property, Fukuch1 wanted to 
know about吐leaπangements bemg considered for the movement of 
Frnm Reoooup.iwn to EXPO 47 
Japanese and touched off an angry response from Gimson when he 
was reminded出at'whether the Japanese can ltve in Kowloon or not 
is a matter of humanity, so we would ltke to enquire further. ’ 
Gimson replied that 'you can be assured由atBritish officials in this 
Colony, together with the military, are fully alive to the require-
ments of humanity in dealing with o廿1ernationals, and I consider 1t 
is an impertinence and out of place for the Japanese au出oritiesto 
raise such a question.＇防， Outof place it might be, but the British had 
to handle al sides m出 kidgloves. The Chinese authorities needed 
to be placated through a田urancesof Sino British cooperation in 
estimating food and fuel positions, m huntmg down suspected war 
cnmmals and in prorrusing to permit Chinese troops acce田 toHong 
Kong’s port and air facilities 'for出eoccupat10n of Japan, Formosa, 
or points on the coast of Chma and Manchuria脚 Similarapprecia 
tion of American sensitivities kept any repetition of earlier 
anticolonialism from reappearing at the highest level at least伺
President Truman’s remarks at Potsdam over Britain’s sovereignty 
and the views of MacArthur over the retention of Hong Kong 
undoubtedly helped. The first United Stat田 unitsto visit the 
territory began arnvmg on 9 October according to reports carried 
in The New 路地 η朗自＿ Later the same mon血 MadameChiang 
Kai-shek also visited Hong Kong and, though employing some 
facesavmg measures to avoid any formal recogmt10n of the British 
return, the I田ueof p o盟国s10nsubsequently lost its immediacy_ 
Chinese atlas田 wouldincorporate Hong Kong wi出mtheir domam 
and then qualify this by adding“British occupied.” 
The immediate difficulties facing the British administration centred 
on restoring essential se四1ces.There was httle time to spare over 
白ecolony’s future, though presumably any succ白S田 ingettmg Hong 
Kong back to a semblance of normality would strengthen the British 
government’S hand Issues of security, food and currency had to be 
tackled firsι （The fact曲目 MajorG田eralPan, the head of the 
Chinese Military Delegation in the Hong Kong area, wrote to 
Harcourt on 16 September to inform him that he had been mstructed 
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to witness the surrender ceremomes, though adrmtted旬、Nithoutany 
authority to sign,'• further eased the intemat10nal tension) 
The chief Japanese legacy to Hong Kong m 出eautumn of 1945 
was an economic m田s.The harbour was mined, rice scarce, the 
cu町encysituation confused and the exodus of Chmese who had 
voted with吐1eirfeet only confirmed the obv10us. Hong Kong 
government estimates of the Japanese disrupt10n to local industry 
were damning. Figures prepared in April 1947 suggested出at50% of 
出eweaving, 75% of the knitting, 90% of吐1erubber factories, al the 
paint, 40% of the match, 50% of the vacuum flask and 30% of the 
torch battery plants had been destroyed.仰 Yetrehabilitation in many 
cases appears to have been rapid and the Hong Kong government 
was decidedly uninterested in being lumbered with out of date 
Japanese machinery under possible reparations programmes."·• 
lndustnahsts were left to get on w1出 itby themselves The 
government saw its iob to patch up essential services, to reopen 
communicat10ns and solve the cu町田cysituation It had also to 
r配 ommence some rudimentary policing, though the Colorual 
Secretary as late as June 1946 had to remind a quest10nnaire at 
Leg co也at‘出erestoration of吐1erule of law after the anarchy and 
chaos left by the Japanese 1s a vital problem for every Government 
m the Far East area and that the circumstances in Hong Kong as 
elsewhere are as yet far from normal Scarcely a week has passed 
without the police being fired on in出estreets of our口ty.＇附
Measures to begin to erase memon田 ofthe Japanese occupation 
were qmckly put mto effect ・Following the surrender ceremom田
only one Japanese national was permitted to continue to reside in 
the colony. Japanese rmhtary scnp - defmed by London as 
s“Banana”Currency' - became worthless as part of a British 
government decis10n applicable to al its Asian territories."" Minor 
war cnm田 trialscommenced'13) and the Japanese war memorial was 
blown up. Yet the basis for future relations between Hong Kong and 
Japan was simultaneously being constructed Hong Kong, despite its 
bitteme田， couldonly survive through trade with its former occupier 
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Pragmatism won out. What ultimately mattered for the territory’s 
future was not the apprehension of prison camp guards or reparation 
claims, but reconstruction. The Governor put 1t succinctly to出e
Colonial Office in December 1947 when he noted出at'[e]arly 
rehabilitation of Japan [is] therefore of more importance to Hong 
Kong.’It might be bad politics to spell it out too clearly, yet there 
was no option but to move fast 
Commendable speed led Hong Kong to mstall its own repr田enta-
tive m Japan to pr田sthe advantag田 ofbo出 privateand govern -
ment to gover町nenttrade between SCAP and the colony Working 
under loose authorization of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission, 
Hong Kong’s agent could write to General Marquat, head of 
Econormc and Sc1en!Ific Section, as early as october 1946出at出e
territory '1s now in a positwn to place firm orders for Japanese 
goods.’In reply it was confirmed by SCAP GHQ that Sterling would 
be employed for such trade, subject to agreement that accrued 
Sterling balances might be later liquidated in US dollars and出at
al cotton textiles also be paid for in dollars.帥 Thisarrangement 
appears to have found litle favour with the British government or 
1包 Missionin Tokyo The acting head of Hong Kong’s depar!Inent 
of suppl!田， tradeand mdustry wrote the following year that‘I say 
quite frankly that UKLIM do田 notand cannot represent us 
adequately.岬 Thesame official also noted that the Hong Kong 
approach of encouragmg 'an unconventwnal man’who ‘does things m 
an unconventional way’was clearly paying of, though his 'ruthless’ 
manner had inevitably brought him enem1白
The evidence (admittedly largely from Hong Kong Public Records 
Office sources) sug耳目白血atHong Kong and SCAP’s ESS section 
worked well together Both were eager for substantial trade lmks 
and welcomed the opportunity to develop these without the political 
pr田 S町田 thatusually surrounded SCAP GHQ Reports from semor 
Hong Kong visitors to Tokyo spoke of ESS staff as competent but 
workmg under ‘heavy political disabilities imposed on them by 
Washington，’ while UK.LIM was described as wanting to assist but 
50 
‘bound by al the most rigid Foreign Office rules, which leads them 
to take a defensive, even defeatist, attitude. They would rather make 
no move than run the slightest nsk of offending the Americans This 
is I am afraid not appreciated by the Americans who would much 
prefer a more vigorous, if les orthodox, line."0' 
Ties between Hong Kong’s commercial figures and SCAP GHQ 
were close The territory had demonstrated its eagerne田 fortrade 
by promising not to be too selective over出enature of its Japanese 
imports and General MacArthur himself went out of his way to 
assist the territory"" The case of penruttmg scarce Kyushu coal to 
be shipped to Hong Kong is evidence indeed of goodwill on the 
supreme commander's behalf. Despite fuel shortages m occupied 
Japan, MacArthur instructed Hong Kong’s agent in Tokyo to work 
out arrangements with General Marquat MacArthur, clearly well 
briefed on the coal 1田uefor his mterviews with Sir Alvary 
Gascoigne and his UKLIM staf, was correct to claim出athis 
generosity seemmgly went agamst‘al commonsense and reason’ 
Hong Kong’S governor rightly termed relat10ns between his colony 
and SCAP 'excellent.’ 
The same could hardly be said of Hong Kong’s discuss10ns with 
London over Japan. Hong Kong and SCAP GHQ wished to 
maximise private trade at the earliest po田ible date without 
concernmg出回IBelv田 overmuch with currency issues The British 
Treasury, however, had wider concerns. It was wary of permitting 
Hong Kong to be mcorporated mto吐leproposed Sterlmg area 
agreement and disliked the American scheme whereby any accrued 
Sterling surplus in Japan had to be converted into dollars at regular 
intervals. Hong Kong generally sided with Tokyo against Whitehall 
and was apparently kept in the dark over the details of interdepart -
mental discussions m London on Japanese trade同 HongKong 
officials felt也at出efirst requirement was to get trade movmg and 
fmanced, smce the colony badly n田dedJapanese yarn and cotton 
textil田， anddoubted whether London wished to expand Sterlmg area 
trade with Japan until白econvertibility problem had been solved 
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D田piteth田ehandicaps Hong Kong and Japan dtd restore their 
tradmg !mks Japan has remamed since出eearly postwar years the 
principal source of Hong Kong’s imports and the holder of a 
continuingly favourable balance of payments position The eventual 
peace treaty between the Allies and Japan contained litle of direct 
concern to the territory and did nothing to impede the commercial 
relatwnship. The i盟国s,however, of compensatwn for POWs and 
holders of Japanese currency left the Hong Kong authorities with 
litle more than a few crumbs from Japan in the form of small per 
capita s凹 sdispensed by the Red Cross under article 16 of the San 
Francisco treaty. The question of the return of Japanese officials 
and commercial repr田entat町田 wasequally unsatisfactory from the 
Japanese pomt of view. Hong Kong, in line w1世1other British 
territones in Asia, was eager for trade but reluctant to permit 
Japanese nationals to r田 1dein the country The Consul General 
came back, of co町田， once仕1epeace tr田 tyhad b配nsigned and 
JETRO officials arrived in 1956, but progre田 overrelaxing the rules 
to permit any large-scale in百回 ofother citizens was slow The 
Foreign Office m London, with a singular lack of sensitivity, argued 
that this was attributable to the wartime experiences of colonial 
officials at the hands of their Japanese captors, but吐1eissue was 
certainly deeper than this and also concerned Chinese and Indian 
residents of Hong Kong. Recollections of the Japanese occupation 
could not be blotted out and persist m diluted form forty five yearn 
after the fal of Hong Kong.1l9l Questions of local collaboration and 
resistance stil reappear岡
Despite such legacies the 1950s provide the watershed m Hong 
Kong-Japanese postwar relations. It was during this decade出atboth 
sides reassessed their pos1ttons and strengthened economic and 
pohttcal t田 Therapid reconstruction of the Japanese economy was 
the key element in the improvement, since it enabled the two 
econo凶 esto gam greater complementanty and prevent frequent 
clashes between competing, labour-mtenstve industnes as Japan shed 
its past. The advent of Japan’s hyper-growth years gradually reduced 
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Hong Kong's anxieties over Japanese competition. Substantial 
mvestment and enviable annual productivity gains by Japan quickly 
put it mto a different league It was at出isiuncture出at廿1eHong 
Kong government quietly intervened to take advantage of Japan’s 
advance, while watching cautiously for the opportune moment to 
begm altering the political relationship 
From 1946 until 1960出eHong Kong gove口lilentstaffed and 
funded a small section in日1eBritish embassy in Tokyo to monitor 
and direct trade links between the colony and Japan From here 
many Japanese who wished to enter Hong Kong were interviewed 
and vetted. Links were gradually restored , 01led by some prelimi 
nary ping pong diplomacy, though the authorities forbad Japanese 
football teams from entering the colony on the grounds出atsuch 
spectator sports might mflame ra出erthan mend ties. The shift from 
a general policy of restnctmg entry m 1953 not even a circus troupe 
was then allowed short period visas because of its supposed 
Communist leanmgs-to the Governor's approval in 1960 for a large 
nUillber of permits to let Japanese restaurant owners and department 
stores land was remarkable Executive Council in Nov凹 her1960 
reVlewed pohcy to allow Japanese entrants to gam employment m 
industry 'on a selective basis and for reasonable periods，’ provided 
that they possessed specialist skills and arrangements were made for 
曲目r'eventual replacement by local staf.＇帥 TheDirector of 
Commerce and Industry minuted with a greater display of enthusiasm 
than Exco that 'wi出 facihtiesfor techmcal education in the Colony 
so limited, we can also be grateful for the minor and temporary 
contribution of these qualified technicians'. He held血atJapanese 
'quahty standards, marketing techniques, [and] orgamzation methods' 
were needed in Hong Kong.間 Japanesecitizens by 1960 could usually 
gam羽田sfor import/ export trade, shippmg, air, bankmg and 
insurance work more or les automatically. 伺 Evenin世1etextiles 
field Hong Kong could hardly welcome Japanese mvestment and 
refuse the entry of Japanese managerial and technical staffs，吐10ugh
出egovenment had to order an ex gratia pa戸nentto The Chinese 
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Manufacturers' Association m 1964 to mollify出eirconcern over a 
JET RO・sponsoredJapan industrial 白rnibitionon a site developed by 
吐1eAssociation.剛
Any begmnings of widespread public understanding of the two 
Asian societies had to wait until 1970. Hong Kong’s decision to 
part1c1pate in Expo 70 forms a convenient date to close the postwar 
era, though it would be 田feto 1magme出atthe cuπ・ent interest 
、'Ji吐rinHong Kong over the contemporary achievements of Japan 
has not been matched by sinrilar Japanese awarene田 ofHong 
Kong’s record （寸＇hosemany Japanese who complain of Western 
ignorance of thetr nation might recall that others in Asia fel much 
the same irntat10n at Japanese condescenc10n). Yet Expo may have 
contnbuted to brmging a more accurate vis10n of Hong Kong to a 
wider Japanese audience. The Hong Kong pavilion, itself a subject 
of controversy over its allegedly anachromst1c batwing sail design, 
was visited by some nine million people.間 Itwas a pubhc relations 
exercise intended to portray social and mdustnal progre田 It
wished, as the statement at the ground breaking ceremony put it, to 
recall白at‘HongKong is Japan’s second largest export market and 
Japan has a very favourable balance of trade with Hong Kong.’The 
theme throughout was to stre田吐1elaissez faire appraoch behind 
Hong Kong’s transformation and to conveniently ignore the 
uncomfortable reahties of the bureaucratic nature of the pavilion’S 
mception and the social infrastructure 出at underpinned 世田
te汀1tory’spostwar changes 
The first and most important section of the pavilion, at least m 
the ey田 ofthe planner, was devoted to a fictitious refugee farmly m 
the twenty years since its members had arnved from China m the 
expectation出atthe Japanese pubhc would appr配iatethat residents 
had ‘been able to take advantage of Hong Kong’s free enterpnse 
society and through hard work have achieved independence and 
security.1周， Thesecond section wished to pr田entevidence出at'in 
twenty years Hong Kong has changed from a centre for the ntrepot 
trade to a modern industnahsed community ’Attention was placed 
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on the colony’s trading links with Japan and, more particularly, the 
textile ties'"' Some v1s1tors were presumably more taken by 
reminders of Hong Kong’s cultural heritage (a eupherrusm for tourism 
也atconjured up bargain hunting and nights on the town) than the 
laudable so口alengineering 
Stil, Hong Kong had attempted to put itself on the Japanese map 
in what had been the first occasion that the territory had been 
represented at a maior international exposition It may have 
improved the colony’S visibility, though it could hardly expect any 
very tangible returns from its pr田enceat Osaka. Trade was to 
remam hopelessly imbalanced and plainer speaking on that score 
would arise in the 1970s. Yet it was apparent by 1970 that relations 
between Hong Kong and Japan were being given more attent10n by 
both sides. 
Two conclusions may be perrrussible. First，出atthe role of the 
Hong Kong administration in appreciating the paramountcy of 
quickly restoring trading links, while excercismg considerable 
caution in the face of public antipathy towards Japan, has been 
unfairly neglected by those who would beheve that market forces 
alone have driven Hong Kong forward. Secondly that出ecom・ 
mercial and financial nexus has yet to be supplemented by adequate 
cultural ties Tradmg partnerships without sentiment risk coming 
unstuck Economic mutuahty ought not to preclude a Japanese 
attempt to reduce its yawning cultural divide and see Hong Kong as 
something more than a lucrative market It is time for Japan to take 
its alternative diplomacy more seriously. 
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(A sequel based en the British Public Reccrd Office collection for the immediate 
postwar years is fo此hconingin lnlernalional Uuiversily of japan Annual Review, 
vol VJ) 
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占領からエクスポへ
ーホンコンと日本の関係， 1945-1970ー
〈要約〉
ロジャー W パックレー
本稿は，ホンコンにとって重要な日本との戦後関係の発展を考察した
ものであり，太平洋戦争の終結から大阪におけるエクスポ70までの年月
を論じ，以下の諸点を提示する。
(i) ホンコンに対する日本の影響は，ホンコンの輸出主導経済の再建
にとってきわめて重要であった。
(i) 日本に対するホンコン社会全体の根強い反感にもかかわらず，ホ
ンコン当局は，日本との良好な関係を発展させ，早急に戦時中の
領土占領（1941-1945）の記憶をぬぐい去るべき必要の上に立ち
現実を見据えていた。
uiv ホンコンと日本の聞において，通商，産業，財政の各方面での結
ぴっきに注目しなければならないことは言うまでもないが，さら
に両者の関係がより広範な政治的・文化的関心を組み入れたもの
に拡大していくことが必要であるロ
